Collecting debt in New Hampshire: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“It is not the part payment which takes the case out of the statute, but the new promise of which it may be evidence; therefore payment of a part is not enough unless it is made under such circumstances that a promise to pay the remainder may reasonably be inferred from it.”

New Hampshire has no statute on part payment or acknowledgment (RSA 508 section list reviewed; none). Rule is common law: a voluntary part payment, understood by the debtor as part of a larger subsisting debt, is evidence from which a new promise to pay the balance is inferred (Engel: 'The essential fact is that the payment be made by the debtor as a part payment of a greater debt'). Whether the inference arises is a fact question unless nothing qualifies it. Vrusho: 'a maker's payments or acknowledgments of liability indicating a willingness to pay the debt' can toll the statute against the maker but not a guarantor (also Gallagher).

“a direct and unqualified admission by a debtor within the statutory period prior to the commencement of the action, of a subsisting debt which he is liable and willing to pay, [and that this promise] is sufficient evidence of a new promise which will prevent the statute from operating as a bar”

No writing requirement: New Hampshire has no Lord Tenterden-type statute, and Engel says 'No different rule applies to the implication of a new promise from the debtor's acts in the payment than applies to a verbal admission.' Soper: 'The admission itself does not take the action out of the statute of limitations; rather, it is the new promise that may be inferred from that admission that removes the bar.' Vrusho: 'an acknowledgment of debt must be more than a recognition of debt; it must be an admission of liability for an unpaid debt that the party is then willing to pay.' A bare acknowledgment without willingness to pay is insufficient.

New Hampshire Supreme Court: 'The legislature had not at the time of Keeton's suit (nor has it since) enacted a borrowing statute requiring the application of foreign statutes of limitations under any circumstances.' RSA 508 contains no borrowing section (508:9 is only a tolling rule for a defendant's absence). Choice of limitations law is by the court's conflict-of-laws analysis; New Hampshire generally treats limitations as procedural and applies its own periods.

No New Hampshire statute requires a collector to disclose that a debt is time-barred. RSA 358-C:3 (Prohibited Acts) contains no reference to the statute of limitations or time-barred debt and no express bar on suing or collecting expired debt. Federal Reg. F 12 CFR 1006.26 governs. Negative finding by both passes.

The limitations bar affects the remedy only; a new promise revives the barred debt. Soper (read on CAP) addresses a debt already barred: the debt fell due June 1, 1989, the three-year period ran in 1992, the debtor signed a second agreement in October 1994, and suit was filed June 1996; the court reversed summary judgment because the 1994 writing could support 'a new promise to revive the cause of action', while holding that 'a mere acknowledgment of the prior debt ... by itself, is insufficient to warrant the inference that a new promise has been made.' Under Engel the same inference can arise from a part payment made as part of a greater debt, and a payment 'is not enough unless it is made under such circumstances that a promise to pay the remainder may reasonably be inferred from it.' So a post-expiry payment revives only if the circumstances support inferring a promise to pay the balance; it is not automatic, and the inference must be drawn by the trier of fact. No statute. Payments by a maker do not ordinarily revive a guarantor's liability (Gallagher; Vrusho).