Collecting debt in Ohio: licensing, bonds and statutes of limitations.

“If payment has been made upon any demand founded on a contract, or a written acknowledgment thereof, or a promise to pay it has been made and signed by the party to be charged, an action may be brought thereon within the time limited by sections 2305.06 and 2305.07 of the Revised Code, after such payment, acknowledgment, or promise.”

“a debt already barred by the statute of limitations may be revived by an acknowledgment or a new promise.”

Shorter-of rule, but narrow since 2021 (text re-read on codes.ohio.gov). (B) reaches only a 'tort action, as defined in section 2305.236' accrued elsewhere, barred if expired under either the foreign law or Ohio law. (C) bars a written-contract action 'other than an action described in division (C) of section 2305.07' that 'seeks post-default interest at a rate governed by or provided in the substantive laws of any other state ... in excess of the rate of interest provided by section 5703.47' if expired under either law; (D) does the same for a 2305.07(C) consumer action seeking post charge-off interest above the 5703.47 rate. S.B. 13 sec. 3(B) made amended (B) retroactive to April 7, 2005. Before S.B. 13, 2305.03(B) reached any cause of action; Taylor v. First Resolution, 2016-Ohio-3444, used it to borrow Delaware's shorter period for a credit-card debt (cause accrues where the debt was to be paid). Under the current text an ordinary consumer collection action that does not seek excess foreign-rate interest is governed by Ohio's own 2305.07(C), which applies 'notwithstanding' 2305.03(B).

“If interposed by proper plea by a party to an action mentioned in any of those sections, lapse of time shall be a bar to the action.”

No Ohio statute or OAC rule requiring a time-barred-debt disclosure in collection communications was located by either pass (Titles 13 and 23, the CSPA, and R.C. 1319.12 searched). Federal Reg F, 12 CFR 1006.26, governs. Suing or threatening suit on time-barred debt is actionable under the OCSPA per Taylor, 2016-Ohio-3444: 'the filing of a time-barred collection action may form the basis of violations under the FDCPA and the OCSPA.' Limitations is a pleaded bar, not an extinguishment (2305.03(A)).

2305.08 treats payment, signed written acknowledgment and signed promise alike and does not distinguish payments made before or after expiration. Butler (Ohio Supreme Court): 'a debt already barred by the statute of limitations may be revived by an acknowledgment or a new promise'; Coffin v. Secor itself involved an 1876 letter acknowledging an 1868 account already past the six-year period. Schmidt v. Hicks addressed a payment on a debt 'barred by the statute for more than 16 years' and refused revival only because the payer was a third party: 'The principle on which part payment takes a case out of the statute is that the party paying intended by it to acknowledge and admit the greater debt to be due' and 'The new promise to pay must be made by the debtor or by some one under his immediate direction.' Limits: the payment must be by or at the direction of the debtor; the 2305.08 rule does not apply to negotiable notes governed by R.C. 1303.16 (Mohammad v. Awadallah, 2012-Ohio-3455, para. 23: 'no court in Ohio has yet done this, and we decline to be the first to do so'). No Ohio Supreme Court holding squarely on a debtor's own post-expiration part payment was found; the statute text plus Butler and Schmidt support yes.